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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
the Legislature, by its enactment of Section 21 suspended the running of the
Statute for a period of eighteen months after the death of the person against
whom a cause of action exists."s
It seems obvious from the previous discussion that the Legislature, by its
enactment of Section 21, intended to prevent a plaintiff's cause of action from
becoming legally ineffective or burdensome by reason of the wrongdoer's death,
and such protection appears to be both reasonable and meritorious in a situa-
tion as was presented in the Butler case where there was no party in existence
for the plaintiff to sue.
However, the need for similar protection does not appear as obvious in
the present case or under similar situations which could arise under Section
118 of Decedant's Estate Law, for the wrongdoer's death, of and by itself,
could not possibly affect the legal efficacy of a cause of action which does
"exist" but which has not yet legally accrued. It is the additional fact that
letters of administration were not issued to defendant's estate until June of
1958-approximately three years after the accrual of action-that raised the
same dilemma in the present case that was presented by Butler v. Price and
cases similar to it, and to which the Legislature, by its enactment of Section
21, addressed itself. To wit, an ineffective cause of action due to the absence
of a liable legal representative to the wrongdoer's estate.
The question that faces us then is: will the courts be as willing to invoke
Section 21 as it did here in other cases arising under Section 118 of Decedant's
Estate Law where an administrator has already been appointed to the wrong-
doer's estate when the action accrues? It would appear not since the reason
for invoking Section 21 would no longer exist and any such use of it (Sec-
tion 21) would obviously be a windfall to plaintiff or his estate. The ques-
tion, however, appears to be left open by this case. It appears the holding is
limited to cases involving Section 118 and is not an overruling of the rule
set forth in the Richnan case.9
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL UNDER SECTION 59 (Now 388) OF THE VEHICLE AND
TRA.rnc LAW
Plaintiffs' administrators commenced the present wrongful death actions
as a result of an automobile accident on a New York highway. The car in
which the plaintiffs' intestates were killed was owned by the defendants, one
of whom had loaned the-car to other persons previous to the accident. Prior
to the instant actions, the plaintiffs had brought suit in New Hampshire against
the driver, one O'Rourke, seeking to impose liability on the insurer of the
car. The insurance policy furnished coverage to the named insured and also
to any person using the automobile with the insured's permission. In a de-
claratory judgment the New Hampshire court found that the limitation im-
8. Supra note 4 at 362, 65 N.Y.S.2d 690 (4th Dep't 1946).
9. Supra note 5.
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posed by the owner upon the permissive use of the car was that it should not
be used at all if O'Rourke was a passenger; therefore, the particular use to
which the car was being put at the time of the accident was not with the
owner's permission, and consequently, the insurer did not have to defend the
action.10
Abandoning the New Hampshire action, the plaintiffs, claiming as a basis
of liability Section 59 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law,'1 then com-
menced the present actions, Hinchey v. Sellers,12 against the owners of the
car. The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether, when under the
same operative facts the ultimate issues differ, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
precluded the New York court from relitigating the New Hampshire court's
finding of fact of a complete denial of defendant's permission. The defendants
maintained that the previous determination of the issue of permissive use
was conclusive, and not, as the plaintiffs argued, simply a determination of
the limits of permissive use in an insurance contract. The Supreme Court
judgment for the defendant, 13 was reversed by the Appellate Division on
two grounds. The issue of permissive use under a contract and under a New
York statute differ totally, and the doctrine of collateral estoppel "is not
applicable to evidentiary findings made in a prior action involving a different
ultimate issue".' 4 The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Ap-
pellate Division and reinstated that of the Supreme Court.
In regard to the first issue, the Court of Appeals found that once the
fact, that the defendant refused to permit O'Rourke to ride in the car, was
established, recovery under Section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was
impossible.' 5 Judge Dye dissented in the present case on the ground that
permission under a policy is one thing, and that permission under a statute
is another; each issue must be decided separately. The majority would agree
with the dissent's contention, in most instances, but under the present facts,
where the owner expressly forbade O'Rourke to ride in the car, to find any
permission under a policy or under a statute is impossible.
As for the second issue, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate
Divisions' finding that the ultimate issues in the two suits differed, but main-
tained that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did apply to the issue of per-
missive use. The fact that O'Rourke was forbidden to ride in the car was
a finding essential to the first judgment, and the plaintiffs, therefore, are
prevented from relitigating this previously determined issue. The Appellate
10. Hinchey v. National Surety Co., 99 NZH. 378, 11 A.2d 827 (1955).
11. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 59 (now § 388):
Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and respon-
sible for death* or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence . . .
by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or
implied, of such owner....
12. 7 N.Y.2d 287, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959).
13. 1 Misc. 2d 711, 147 N.Y.S.2d 893 (County Ct. 1955).
14. 5 A.D.2d 440, 446, 147 N.Y.S.2d 47, 53 (4th Dep't 1958).
15. Arcara v. Moresse, 258 N.Y. 211, 179 N.E. 389 (1932).
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Division in its opinion relied heavily on the decision of Fox v. Employers'
Liability Assur. Corp.,16 one of three related cases on the same subject. The facts in
that case were similar to those in the present case, except that the first' of the
suits involved the issue of permission under Section 59 and the second under
an insurance policy; in the present case the order of these issues is reversed.
In the Fox case, which was never reviewed by the Court of Appeals, the defense
of res judicata was not upheld by the court on the ground that the causes of
action differed. It was held that only consent under Section 59, and not con-
sent under a policy, was determined in the first judgment. The Court of
Appeals in the present case overruled the Fox case as authority for denying
the effect of collateral estoppel where the ultimate legal issues in the two
suits differ.
The doctrine of res judicata has two distinct phases-barring a second
suit designed to relitigate a prior cause of action, and rendering the prior
determination of certain issues of law and fact conclusive in any subsequent
suit between the same parties or their privies. Where the causes of action are
identical in both suits, direct estoppel, the first phase, would apply; however,
where the causes of action differ, only collateral estoppel may apply.'7 In
the present case, the Court used the term "ultimate issue" to signify cause
of action, for if the "ultimate issues" were the same, the suits would have
been identical, except for the change of defendants which would only have
amounted to a substitution of privies. Direct estoppel would have applied,
and not collateral estoppel; it is only because of the "ultimate issues" were
different that collateral estoppel applied.' 8
The doctrine of collateral estoppel states that a fact essential to recovery,
which is put in issue and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, can-
not be relitigated in a subsequent- suit between the same parties or their
privies.19 However, collateral estoppel does not apply to all facts decided in
an action, but only to ultimate facts placed in issue because such facts will
have been thoroughly contested by the parties and then employed by the
court in rendering its riecision.2
If the effect of collateral estoppel is thus limited to ultimate facts,0 it
becomes necessary to distinguish between such a fact and an evidentiary fact.
"A proposition of evidentiary fact is a proposition to which no legal conse-
quences immediately attach, but which is used tQ establish another proposi-
16. 239 App. Div. 671, 268 N.Y. Supp. 536 (4th Dep't 1934).
17. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg
Realty Co., 250 N.Y. 304, 165 N.E. 456 (1929).
18. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1942); Collateral
Estoppel by Judgment, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 647 (1952).
19. Tait, Collector of Internal Revenue v. Western Maryland R. Co., 289 U.S. 620
(1933); Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897); The Evergreens v.
Nunan, 41 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944); House v. Lockwood, 137 N.Y. 259, 33 N.E. 595
(1893); 50 CJ.S., Judgments, § 712.
20. Cambria v. Jefferey, 307 Mass. 49, 29 N.E.2d 555 (1940); Karameros v. Luther,
279 N.Y. 87, 17 N.E.2d 779 (1938).
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tion of fact (the ultimate fact) to which legal consequences attach. 21 State-
ments concerning to whom the defendant gave the keys to the car are evi-
dentiary leading up to the ultimate fact, that the defendant forbade O'Rourke's
presence in the car, to which legal consequences attach. In order to avoid in-
consistent and incongrous results, findings of ultimate fact must be conclusive
in a subsequent action.
It is possible that the Hinchey case represents an example of judicial
evasion of a difficult problem in the doctrine of collateral estoppel-namely,
what constitutes an ultimate or evidentiary fact. Definitions may be ex-
pounded, but their application to a specific fact situation is not automatic.
In the present case, the Appellate Division found the lack of permission by
the owner in regard to O'Rourke's presence in the car to be an "underlying
evidentiary question"; the Court of Appeals found the same fact to be "a
finding essential to judgment." Neither court, however, states any substantial
reasons in arriving at a conclusion nor attempts to clarify the difference be-
tween an evidentiary and ultimate fact.
WHo is AN AGGRIEVED PARTYr UNDER CIVIL PRACTICE ACT SECTION 557.
A patient's action for malpractice against a doctor and a private hospital,
in Baidach v. Togut,2 2 occasioned a consideration of the relationship between
Sections 557 and 211-a of the New York Civil Practice Act. The former con-
cerns the meaning of "aggrieved party" for appeal purposes while Section 211-a
grants the right to contribution among joint tort-feasors.
The plaintiff obtained a jury verdict and judgment against the doctor and
hospital owner, but the Appellate Division dismissed the claim against the
doctor and reduced the amount of the judgment.23 The hospital owner paid
the reduced judgment and attempted to appeal the dismissal of the doctor
claiming that since he lost the right of contribution against the doctor he was an
aggrieved party under Section 557(2) and thus qualified to appeal.24
The Court of Appeals held that the hospital owner was not a party ag-
grieved by the Appellate Division ruling because he has no right of contribution
against the doctor at the time he paid the judgment, and thus he had no right
to appeal.
There was no right of contribution at common law. An injured person
could sue any one of several joint tort-feasors and recover full damages, the
paying defendant having no recourse against the other tort-feasors. In deroga-
21. Morris, Law and Fact, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1303, 1326 (1942). See also, The
Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944).
22. 7 n.Y.2d 128, 196 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1959).
23. 8 A-D.2d 838, 190 N.YS.2d 120 (2d Dep't 1959) as amended 9 A.D.2d 628, 191
NS.Y.S.2d 365 (2d Dep't 1959).
24. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 557(2):
A person aggrieved who . . . has acquired since the making of the order or the
iendering of the judgment appealed from an interest which would have entitled
him to be so substituted if it had been previously acquired, may also appeal; ...
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